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Trade and
Border Security
as Political Issues
in Canada
by Howard Cody
Here, we present the second of two articles on Canadian-
American free trade that were generated by a February 5,
2003 forum co-sponsored by the Maine International
Trade Center and University of Maine Canadian
American Center. Howard Cody begins where his
University of Maine colleague, Scott See, leaves off—with
passage of the Free Trade Agreement—and brings readers
up to the present day, where trade and border security
concerns have become inextricably combined. Cody argues
that Canadians will not persuade Americans to distinguish
between the two concerns and, consequently, that Canadians
will eventually accept some sacrifice in national sovereignty
in order to maintain the benefits of their current trade 
and investment relationship with the United States.  
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TRADE AND BORDER POLITICS 
BEFORE MULRONEY 
Before the 1980s, Canada’s political leadersroutinely professed support for “enhanced” or
“freer” trade between Canada and the United States.
After all, Canada had benefited greatly from the 
1854-1866 Reciprocity agreement the British negoti-
ated with the United States for their North American
colonies. It was during this brief interval that Canada
prospered from the recently built Montreal to Portland
railway that gave Montreal year-round access to the
Atlantic. After the Americans abrogated Reciprocity to
punish the British for selling the Confederacy a navy,
Canadians tried to persuade the United States to nego-
tiate a new trade deal. On the one occasion when they
succeeded, in 1911, Canadian voters unexpectedly
turned out of office the government that had negoti-
ated the new Reciprocity agreement from fear of an
American takeover.
Still, in the early 1920s geography trumped
Imperial Preference when the United States replaced
Britain as Canada’s largest trade partner and its leading
source of foreign investment. Canada-U.S. tariffs finally
started to fall after 1935, when Liberal Prime Minister
Mackenzie King and Democratic President Franklin
Roosevelt instituted a most-favored-nation tariff reduc-
tion program to counter the Great Depression. During
the lengthy period that followed the War of 1812’s
border incursions, complacency about the “world’s
longest undefended border” generally kept border secu-
rity off both countries’ agendas. The major exception
occurred in the 1920s. Canada gave American agents
little help when they attempted to stop the importation
of Canadian whisky and beer during Prohibition.
By 1980 the United States accounted for some
70% of Canada’s exports and imports. With this depen-
dence, Canadians resented congressional protectionism
that hindered access to the American market for 
major exports such as softwood lumber. Liberal Prime
Minister Pierre Trudeau’s Third Option campaign of
the 1970s sought out alternative Western Hemisphere,
European, or Asian trading partners or blocs to bolster
Canada’s multilateral relationships and reduce its 
disadvantageous bilateral trade, investment, and cultural
reliance on the United States.
Nothing was available. For
example, the European
Community rebuffed Trudeau’s
initiative to forge a “contractual
link” that would have given
Canada almost an associate
membership in Europe.  
At the same time, historical
experience (the events of 1911
haunted politicians for seven
decades) and prevailing sensitiv-
ities about the need to protect
national sovereignty and an
identity different from the
United States continued to deter
elected politicians of all parties
from endorsing a comprehen-
sive free trade deal with the
United States. Besides, during
the twentieth century Canada’s
dominant Liberal party gained something of a nation-
alist reputation. Most Liberals argued against closer 
ties with the United States. The ground began to shift
around 1975 when non-elected government bodies 
like the Economic Council of Canada and Canada’s
appointed Senate, along with the business-supported 
C. D. Howe Institute think tank, suggested that 
Canada approach the United States about negotiating
an across-the-board trade pact. The Trudeau govern-
ment responded cautiously with a proposal for free
trade on a limited sectoral basis; that is, it negotiated
one sector at a time. If all went well, something 
more wide-ranging might gradually evolve. Trudeau
also appointed one of his senior cabinet ministers, 
Donald Macdonald, to head a well-publicized Royal
Commission on Canada’s Economic Prospects. All 
sides to the issue eagerly awaited Macdonald’s report.
MULRONEY AND REAGAN 
STRIKE A TRADE DEAL
The 1984 election of Conservative Brian Mulroneyduring the Ronald Reagan administration in
Washington increased the momentum for a comprehen-
Canada now relies
on the United
States for 85% 
of its imports and
exports, more 
than ever before.
Cross-border 
trade exceeds 
$1.3 billion 
U.S. every day.
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sive trade deal. Mulroney, a former president of
American-owned Iron Ore Company of Canada, 
had close ties to the business elites of both countries.
Like Mulroney, most business leaders believed that 
the removal of tariff protection would make Canada
more competitive by forcing governments to exercise
greater fiscal discipline through tax and spending
restraint, and by imposing a “leaner and meaner” 
efficiency on Canadian businesses. The business-
friendly Reagan administration endorsed the initiative.
The Department of Commerce’s United States
International Trade Commission determined in 1985
that only two of 35 major industrial sectors in the
United States economy might suffer under free trade
with Canada. Then came the long-awaited Macdonald
Royal Commission Report. The respected Liberal
recommended that Canada pursue comprehensive free
trade talks with the Americans. Mulroney now enjoyed
all the political cover he needed to proceed.
Negotiations for the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (CUFTA or simply FTA) dragged on for 
17 months between May 1986 and October 1987.
They concluded one day before the October 4 deadline
that Congress had set as part of its approval of fast-
track negotiations. Fast track meant that Congress
would have to accept or reject the deal as negotiated
with no changes. The protracted bargaining testified 
to free trade’s political sensitivity in Canada. It also
reflected Canadian negotiator Simon Reisman’s failure
to persuade Americans to grant Canada’s key objective
besides securing access to the United States consumer
market. Canada wanted ad hoc binational panels 
to settle disputes with binding rulings that had the
authority to override a protection-minded Congress
and avert further countervailing and anti-dumping
duties on Canadian exports.
Canadians considered this concession a perfectly
reasonable quid pro quo for Americans’ guaranteed
access to Canada’s energy resources and to its banking
and investment services. But American negotiators 
used their standard “good cop-bad cop” routine 
on the Canadians by claiming with regret that they
could not persuade members of Congress to accept 
an arrangement that weakened their ability to protect
their constituents’ jobs. Canada had to settle for panels
that merely interpret existing laws that Congress
retains the authority to change. Unfortunately for
Canada, the two countries could not agree on a defini-
tion of subsidy for these panels to enforce. They 
gave themselves 10 years to negotiate a subsidies code.
After 16 years, they have yet to agree on one. None 
is in sight. Each country still may define a subsidy 
as it wishes and impose duties to the other’s irritation.
The United States did this in 2002 with a 27.2% duty
(some $4 million CDN every day) on Canada’s soft-
wood lumber exports, and in 2003 with a 3.94% 
duty on Canadian durum wheat. Seemingly endless
negotiations have not yet settled the softwood dispute.
Because panels must review duties in accordance with
existing law, Congress may change laws when rulings
go against its constituents’ interests. Besides, panels
consume a great deal of time. They may offer their
own unpredictable interpretations of what does and
does not qualify as a subsidy. This is not the dispute
settlement device that Canadians tried to negotiate.
CANADA’S TRADE POLITICS 
FROM THE FTA TO THE NAFTA
At first Canadian public opinion was closely dividedon the FTA. In late 1988 Mulroney called an 
election in which the still non-ratified FTA was the
principal issue. He won a second government with 
well under half of the votes for his Conservatives
when anti-FTA Canadians split between the Liberals
and New Democrats. This permitted his Conservatives
to win many parliamentary districts, especially in
Ontario, where prevailing opinion opposed the deal. In
his second government, Mulroney enacted the FTA and
Each country still may define a
subsidy as it wishes and impose
duties to the other's irritation.
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moved Canada toward the NAFTA, including Mexico.
Canada had never betrayed much interest in a closer
relationship with Mexico or Latin America. The
Canadian government, wishing to stay out of disputes
between the United States and Latin American coun-
tries, had declined repeated invitations to join the
mostly Latin Organization of American States (OAS).
Mulroney finally brought Canada into the OAS. He
was left no alternative on trade with Mexico when 
the Bush administration and Mexican President 
Carlos Salinas decided that free trade was in their
mutual interest. Canada could not allow firms based 
in the United States but not Canada to enjoy access 
to Mexico’s large market. Canadians feared that Asian 
and other investors would locate their operations 
in the United States rather than Canada to secure 
the benefits of free trade in both directions.
NAFTA was negotiated between summer 1991
and summer 1992. Canadians directed much less 
attention to the NAFTA talks than those for the FTA,
apparently because they expected NAFTA to extend 
the existing FTA to Mexico. The deal subsequently
cleared Congress and Parliament in 1993 without
much difficulty. Even so, Canadians were annoyed that
Mexico had managed to convince American negotiators
that the nationalistic Mexican public could not accept
free trade unless their government retained the right 
to control Mexico’s energy resources and investment.
Canadians knew they had no chance of gaining a
concession of this kind.
In the 1993 election, Mulroney’s successor Kim
Campbell led the Conservatives to a crushing defeat.
Although the Liberals promised in their Red Book
platform to reopen the NAFTA to add labor and 
environmental guarantees, they chose not to make free
trade a major issue this time before or after the election.
Liberal leader Jean Chretien—who remains Prime
Minister to this day—recognized that anti-free trade
sentiment had declined since 1988 and had been
replaced with grudging support. Besides, by 1993
Canada’s economy had accommodated itself to the
new regime. Reversion to the situation of just a few
years before would have imposed serious new adjust-
ment problems. Chretien accepted the NAFTA without
revisions, as did President Clinton, despite their
complaint that it offered too little protection to
Mexico’s environment and workers.
On January 1, 1994, the FTA’s fifth anniversary,
its successor took effect. Predictably, Canada’s trade
dependence on the United States has grown still
further. Canada now relies on the United States for
85% of its imports and exports, more than ever before.
Cross-border trade exceeds $1.3 billion U.S. every day.
Further, 40% of Canada’s income derives from exports
to the United States. All exports accounted for some
43% of Canada’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
in 2001, up from 26% just 12 years earlier when the 
first free trade deal took effect. Canada depends more
heavily on export trade for its economic health than
any other large industrialized country. By comparison,
the comparable 2001 figure for the United States and
Japan’s exports was only about 10% of GDP. 
THE POLITICS OF TRADE UNDER NAFTA, 
THE WTO, AND THE FUTURE FTAA 
By the mid-1990s, Canadian opposition to free trade in mainstream politics was confined to the
politically marginal left-wing New Democrats. At the
1999 “Battle of Seattle” at a World Trade Organization
(WTO) meeting, New Democrats joined with anti-
capitalist globalization protestors. They argued that trade
deals primarily advantage transnational corporations by
placing profits above national governments’ ability to
safeguard their citizens’ social rights and benefits, and
by eroding the political will to do so. Many Canadian
nationalists, scandalized by the extent to which Canada
relies on its trade relationship with the United States for
its standard of living, fear that Canada no longer can
afford to assert for itself a role in international politics.
They wonder how long Canada can dare to take posi-
tions on controversial issues, such as the Kyoto protocol
on global warming and an International Criminal 
Court (ICC), that differ from United States policies. But
globalization’s critics still enjoy limited support. Recent
opinion polls show that Canadians feel optimistic about
Canada’s prospects and approve the direction the
country is taking. They believe that Canada can compete
with all comers in the globalizing economy and welcome
the opening of new markets for Canada’s goods.
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In this favorable climate the Chretien government
has freely exploited Canada’s commitment to the 
principle and practice of multilateralism in world
affairs. Chretien has continued Mulroney’s policy of
persuading Canadians that trade deals qualify as multi-
lateral initiatives much like peacekeeping and Canada’s
activities at the United Nations. The Liberal govern-
ment welcomes and exploits all opportunities for
Canada to enhance its trade. Chretien portrays
Canadian membership in the WTO as a successful
example of multilateral cooperation. Also, Chretien has
not missed a chance to demonstrate Canadian indepen-
dence from American policies on matters like Kyoto
and the ICC. He wants to show that Canada still can
assert an independent foreign policy without endan-
gering the economic benefits from its close trade and
investment relationship with its powerful southern
neighbor. The Prime Minister’s February 2003 speech
to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, in which
he lectured his audience on the importance of United
States support for the UN, NATO, and other multilat-
eral organizations, typifies the Chretien approach. 
So did Chretien’s many pronouncements on Iraq that
renounced a Canadian role in a new military operation
without explicit United Nations Security Council
authorization. Chretien’s approach receives a good
reception in Canada for walking a fine line between
kowtowing to American policy and antagonizing
American policymakers. It also reflects and mollifies 
the Liberal party’s nationalist impulse. As if to confirm
the Prime Minister’s moderation, the New Democrats
on the left and the Canadian Alliance on the right
deride his policies from opposing perspectives. Polls
indicate that Canadians consider the Liberal party “far
and away” the best defender of Canada’s sovereignty.
The Chretien government also is promoting the
prospective Free Trade Agreement of the Americas.
Quebec City’s Second Summit of the Americas in
Spring 2001 represented a Canadian effort to extend
NAFTA and Canada’s existing trade agreement with
Chile into a full Hemispheric free trade zone excluding
only Cuba. The events of September 11, 2001 and
recent economic crises in several South American coun-
tries have stalled any post-summit momentum towards
the projected January 2005 FTAA final agreement. Still,
Canada’s government knows that recent polls report
some 70% of Canadians-and an even higher
percentage of coveted young middle class voters—
associate trade liberalization with economic growth and
multilateral cooperation that can bolster Canada’s iden-
tity and international reputation. These Canadians
expect the FTAA to provide economic benefits to
Canada, Latin America, and themselves personally.
NAFTA also has raised Canadians’ belated conscious-
ness of Latin America, which presently offers Canada
its best opportunity to gain important new trade part-
ners and reduce its dependence on the bilateral rela-
tionship with the United States.
TRADE OUTLOOK: CANADA POST-CHRETIEN
WOOS “THE ONE MARKET THAT COUNTS” 
Recognizing that the United States now makes up“the one market that counts,” Canada has begun 
a new initiative to secure even closer trade ties. The
Canadian government is simply accepting reality. With
merchandise exports to its NAFTA partners having
increased 95% between 1993 and 2001 to $580 
billion CDN (only $15 billion of it with Mexico),
Canada knows that it must safeguard and advance 
its markets in the United States. Canada’s $96 billion
CDN merchandise trade surplus of 2001 testifies to the
benefits that Canada is deriving from trade deals. Trade
Minister Pierre Pettigrew wants to increase Canada’s
current 19% share of the United States import market.
Pettigrew would like Americans to appreciate Canada’s
contribution to their own prosperity by making them
more aware of, and more dependent on, trade with
Canada. He also proposes to expand Canada’s visibility
in the United States and its influence over federal 
policymaking by persuading Americans at local,
regional, and state levels to lobby their members of
Congress against protectionist initiatives. Pettigrew
evidently believes “all politics is local” in Washington.
He thinks that pressure from the states drives congres-
sional and administration policy. Because pressure from
Canada has little impact on Congress, it cannot substi-
tute for lobbying Washington from the states.
Of Canada’s five parliamentary parties, only the
small New Democratic party rejects Canada’s full
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commitment to the WTO, NAFTA, and FTAA. Prime
Minister Chretien intends to retire in February 2004.
When Chretien leaves office, former Finance Minister
Paul Martin likely will succeed him. Martin and his
strongest Liberal leadership rival John Manley support
Canadian participation in trade pacts as strongly as
does Chretien. So does Official Opposition leader
Stephen Harper of the pro-business Canadian 
Alliance party, as well as the new leader whom the
Conservatives will select later this year. Canada’s
extreme dependence on trade, especially with the
United States, precludes a Canadian retreat towards
protectionism.
TOWARD—AND BEYOND—A SMART BORDER 
Canadians have taken some time to recognize that the events of September 11, 2001 have forever
changed the United States-Canada border. For Canada,
keeping the border open to the free flow of people
and—especially—goods in the face of deepening
economic integration has been the paramount priority.
Since September 11, 2001 the United States has
become increasingly sensitive to border security, princi-
pally regarding travel, visas, immigration, refugees, and
dangerous goods. In many cases these concerns affect
our relationship with Canada more than with any 
other country. Canada has undertaken some initiatives
on its own. For example, Canada has tightened its
refugee system, especially concerning the 70% of
Canada’s refugee claimants who enter from the United
States. Canadian passports are being made harder to
falsify. Canada’s non-citizen permanent residents (called
“landed immigrants”) are receiving new tamper-resistant
identity cards. Technology permitting, Canada soon 
may require non-citizens to carry biometric cards with
embedded fingerprints or even retina scans. Similar
cards for all Canadians are under consideration. As in
the United States, this last proposal faces strong public
and political opposition because of its troubling “big
brother” aspects.
Most of Canada’s anti-terrorism activity has
involved cooperation with the United States along 
their 5,500-mile border. Prime Minister Chretien
designated John Manley as Canada’s rough equivalent
to Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge. Manley
has served as Deputy Prime Minister as well as Finance
Minister. By all accounts Manley and Ridge have 
developed a good working and personal relationship.
Their joint Smart Border project has included
Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) and
Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams
(INSETs) to cooperate in guarding the border and 
to help law enforcement, intelligence, and border
enforcement agencies exchange information. Most 
of these units are now in place. The Canadian govern-
ment asserts that they already are disrupting criminal
networks attempting to smuggle illegal migrants (not
necessarily terrorists) across the border. Finally, the two
countries have undertaken studies to determine the
feasibility of joint or shared facilities at certain border
crossings across the continent. These include four 
in Maine, at Calais,
Easton, Monticello, 
and Vanceboro. Overall,
Canada has budgeted
more than $5 billion
CDN to improve security
at its borders. To date,
the Canadian public 
has indicated no serious
concerns about the
expense of border initia-
tives or about any threat
they may pose to
Canada’s sovereignty.
Unfortunately 
for Canada, these joint
ventures are not nearly
enough for the United
States. For one thing,
Congress has passed a
law, called the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Reform Act, to require entry and exit controls for every
person and all goods crossing the border. As the new
law stands, all persons entering or leaving the United
States will be logged in and out of the country by the
end of 2005. Some of them, presumably young men
apparently with Middle Eastern ancestry, will be finger-
printed and photographed. 
Canadians have 
taken some time 
to recognize that 
the events of
September 11, 2001 
have forever changed
the United States-
Canada border.
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The Canadian government considers ethnic profiling
improper and inconvenient. Canada has asked Secretary
of State Colin Powell for a blanket exemption from
these new rules. It is not likely to receive one.
Much worse from the perspective of Canada’s
economic interests, other American legislation will
require truckers to provide up to a full day’s notice 
of commercial shipments into the country by late this
year. The trucking industry insists this is unworkable,
especially in the highly integrated auto industry where
companies routinely issue rush orders on short notice
to their factories on both sides of the border without
regard to whether any particular shipment must cross
the border. The new Free and Secure Trade (FAST)
program, now operational at six of the busiest border
crossings, may alleviate these inconveniences to some
extent. Under FAST, low-risk companies that frequently
use these crossings may apply for special expediting
privileges. None of the FAST crossings are in New
England. The similar NEXUS single alternative 
inspection system offers express clearance to individual
travelers who cross the border frequently at a few 
high-volume crossings.
Neither NEXUS nor FAST reassures Canada’s
business community. Led by the Canadian Council of
Chief Executives and the Canadian Trucking Alliance,
business interests have lobbied vigorously in Ottawa 
to persuade the federal government to implement a
perimeter policy with the United States. They hope that
the American government will agree to exempt Canada
from border controls if the two countries create a
North American perimeter by upgrading the free trade
pact to a customs union with a common external tariff,
and implementing similar (possibly identical) policies
on travel, visas, immigration, and refugees. Even the
Liberal-majority Canadian House of Commons
Committee on Foreign Affairs is considering a recom-
mendation that the government pursue a customs
union.
Former Canadian ambassador to the United States
Allan Gotlieb similarly suggests that Canada exploit its
favorable position in North America while Americans
are preoccupied with homeland security. Canada should
take advantage of this opportunity to present a package
of proposals offering nothing less than a “grand
bargain.”  The two countries might profitably negotiate
a “community of laws” featuring a customs union, a
common perimeter, abolition of all trade remedy laws,
and a single set of binding rules guaranteeing free
movement of people and goods across the border. 
This arrangement would give the United States the
fully integrated border, immigration, and security 
policies it desires. Canada would get assured access to
the American consumer market, finally freed from the
threat of countervailing duties. A successful application
of Gotlieb’s linkage would give both countries what
they want and need most. Because Congress’s protec-
tionist forces will derail incremental or sectoral initia-
tives, Gotlieb insists that, like the Free Trade Agreement
of the 1980s, his proposed grand bargain must be
comprehensive. But Gotlieb is vague on sensitive issues.
For example, who would draft his proposed set of
laws, who would interpret these rules, and who would
determine the standards for interpretation?
To date Manley has declined to consider such a far-
reaching initiative. Public opinion in Canada may not 
be prepared to endorse this level of integration. After
all, the harmonization of the two countries’ policies
almost certainly would require Canada to adopt many
American practices. The Liberal government is well
known for its sensitivity to public opinion. Its polling
firm Pollara continually measures opinion on these and
other issues through focus groups. However, the public
can change its mind quickly. If the United States imple-
ments its new border policies, and particularly if foreign
investors and Canadian-based firms relocate south of
the border to avoid border delays and other uncertain-
ties and inconveniences, Canadians and their govern-
ment will give a perimeter proposal like Gotlieb’s
Canadians will not persuade Americans
to make a clear distinction between
trade and border security concerns.
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another look. They may even do so preemptively if
they believe these developments are about to occur.
CONCLUSION
Canadians seem genuinely divided on the currentstatus of Canada’s relationship with the United
States. Some well-known Canadians, like Gotlieb,
lament that Canada is acting like a “fading power” 
that has lost much of its former prestige, credibility, 
and clout in its international relationships generally.
These observers fear that Canada invests too little 
in its military and infrastructure maintenance. Equally
damaging is Canada’s failure to cultivate close ties 
with American political leaders. Some Canadians fault
Chretien for neglecting his personal relationship with
President George W. Bush. For these reasons, they
argue that Canada’s leaders cannot induce American
policymakers to seriously consider Canada’s positions
on trade, border security, or other matters. Others
strongly disagree. They insist that Canada retains the
moral authority, international reputation, and economic
strength needed to influence other countries. Even if
this is so, trade and border security issues must contend
with powerful constituencies in the United States that
do not always share Canada’s positions or interests. 
Fading power or not, Canadians will not persuade
Americans to make a clear distinction between trade
and border security concerns. Instead, the two govern-
ments eventually may combine trade and border 
security into a single integrated strategic plan. Any
ambitious package will raise alarm among Canada’s
nationalists. However, the great disproportion in the
two countries’ power and in their reliance on each
other will convince a large majority of Canadians to
overcome their reservations. They will accept some
sacrifice of national sovereignty to maintain indispens-
able benefits in their trade and investment relationship
with the United States. All in all, the freer movement 
of goods, services, capital, technology, and possibly 
also workers across the border, with or without a
formal perimeter policy, would only acknowledge
Canada’s dependency and vulnerability in its post-
NAFTA and post-September 11, 2001 relations with
the United States.  
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